Wealth Concentration: Second Gilded Age by the Numbers

Tariffs, ICE raids, AI layoffs, and healthcare cuts all trace back to one structural condition: the United States now carries the most concentrated wealth distribution since the Federal Reserve began tracking household wealth in 1989, and by historical estimates, since the original Gilded Age itself.

Where we are. As of Q3 2025, the top 1% of U.S. households held 31.7% of all national wealth, the highest share on record in the Fed's data series, with combined assets of roughly $55 trillion: about equal to the total wealth held by the bottom 90% ¹³⁵. The bottom 50% of households hold 2.5% of national wealth, down from 3.4% in 1989, a 26% drop in their share over 35 years ¹³⁶. The top 10% hold 67.2% of all household wealth; the bottom 50% hold an average of $60,000 each ¹³⁷.

The billionaire count tracks the same line. In 1989, there were 66 U.S. billionaires. By late 2025, there were 905, with a combined net worth of $7.8 trillion, nearly double what the bottom 50% of American households hold in total ¹³⁶. Since 1989, the richest 1% saw their combined household wealth grow from roughly $11.7 trillion to $50 trillion in real terms, more than quadrupling ¹³⁶.

How we got here. The postwar decades produced the most equitable wealth distribution in modern American history: the top 1%'s share fell from roughly 30% in the late 1920s to about 20% by the mid-1970s, as union density peaked, the minimum wage rose in real terms, and top marginal tax rates held above 70% ¹³⁸. Since 1978, the line runs the other way. CEO realized compensation is now 1,094% higher than in 1978; typical worker compensation is up 26% over the same period ¹³⁹. The CEO-to-worker pay ratio was 21:1 in 1965 and 31:1 in 1978. By 2000 it had reached 380:1. It stands at 281:1 in 2024, still nearly 14 times the 1965 level ¹³⁹. The bottom 50% of Americans own virtually no corporate stock, so the equity-driven wealth gains of the past 15 years have flowed almost entirely to households in the upper quintile ¹³⁵.

How it compares to the original. Precise comparisons are hard: income tax records did not exist before 1913. But economic historians, working from Census property records and estate data, estimate that the First Gilded Age peak (roughly 1890 to 1900) was more extreme than today: the top 10% likely controlled 70 to 90% of all national wealth, and the richest 4,000 families held roughly as much wealth as the other 11.6 million families combined ¹⁴⁰¹⁴¹. The intervening century, two world wars, the New Deal, progressive taxation, union expansion, produced a compression that lasted from about 1935 to 1980. The current era reverses that compression. We have not yet closed to the 1900 peak, but we are closing.

Historical estimates for the First Gilded Age are derived from Census property records and estate data; they are less precise than modern Fed survey data.

Money in politics. The wealth concentration does not stay in the economy. It enters the political system. Just 100 billionaire families contributed $2.6 billion to federal elections in 2024, one of every six dollars spent across all candidates, parties, and committees, and 2.5 times what individual billionaire donors spent in 2020 ¹⁴². Billionaire political spending has increased 160-fold since the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision in 2010 ¹⁴². In 2024, 300 billionaires and their families poured $3 billion into the election, representing 0.009% of all donors but approximately 19% of all spending ¹⁴³. One donor contributed $294 million, roughly equivalent to the combined donations of 3 million small-dollar donors ¹⁴⁴. At least 44 of the 902 U.S. billionaires on the 2025 Forbes list were either elected or appointed to state or federal office in the past decade, or are married to someone who was ¹⁴⁵. The problem we document is structural: it applies to any concentration of wealth sufficient to distort democratic outcomes, regardless of the identities of the individuals who happen to hold it.

Competing diagnoses, shared data. The concentration of wealth in politics is a documented condition with competing proposed solutions. We track candidates advocating government-led structural reform: antitrust, tax policy, labor law, healthcare expansion. A competing tradition, rooted in libertarian and free-market economics, argues that reducing government power would eliminate the rent-seeking incentives that drive political spending in the first place: that billionaires buy influence because the government has so much power to sell. Both diagnoses start from the same data. We follow the structural-reform path because that is where the 2026 candidates are running, not because the alternative diagnosis is without merit.

The political dimension. The candidates we track are running against a measurable, documented condition, not a rhetorical abstraction. The data above is drawn from Federal Reserve surveys, EPI analysis, Census records, and Forbes tallies. The original Gilded Age ended because the concentration of wealth became politically untenable, and over two decades produced the Progressive Era reforms that restructured American capitalism. Whether 2026 sits on a similar hinge is the central question we examine.