The Lab
The evidence, in the order the case is made
Six chapters of measured evidence: who owns the country, why the wage stopped following the work, what concentration buys, what it costs a household, what a shock does to the price of moving, and how people are voting about it. Every figure prints its own numbers, names its own source and stamps its own date. Nothing here needs a mouse or a script to be read.
Chapter I
The concentration
Between 1989 Q3 and 2026 Q2 the wealthiest one percent of American households rose from 23 percent of everything owned to 32.5 percent, while the share held by the bottom half fell from 3.4 percent to 2.3 percent.
Bottom 50%: Latest DFA reading 2026 Q2
Top 1% and bottom 50% shares of US household wealth, 1870 to 2026
Two measurements, drawn separately: historical estimates (thin line) and the Federal Reserve's own accounts (gold). A hatched seam marks where the method changes; nothing is drawn across it. The bottom 50% (slate) is Federal Reserve data only, on the same scale.
State of Top 1% and bottom 50% shares of US household wealth, 1870 to 2026
- Fresh a published reading
- Unproven flagged "(est.)" in the source series
Method seam: historical estimates end here and the Federal Reserve DFA begins. They are different measurements and are not joined by a line.
- The bottom 50% line is Federal Reserve DFA only, from 1989 Q3 to 2026 Q2. The source has no earlier estimate, so nothing is drawn before 1989 Q3.
- Live estimate 32.5% (2026-04-01) is a separate, more recent reading. The Federal Reserve has not yet confirmed it as a quarterly figure.
Show the 55 plotted readings
| Series | Period | Value | State | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1870 (est.) | 27.0% | Unproven: Flagged "(est.)" in the source series. | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1890 (est.) | 28.5% | Unproven: Flagged "(est.)" in the source series. | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1900 (est.) | 29.0% | Unproven: Flagged "(est.)" in the source series. | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1913 (est.) | 27.0% | Unproven: Flagged "(est.)" in the source series. | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1928 | 31.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1935 | 28.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1945 | 23.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1955 | 22.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1962 | 21.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1970 | 20.5% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1975 | 20.0% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, historical estimates | 1980 | 21.5% | Fresh | Saez & Zucman / World Inequality Database (historical estimate) |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1989 Q3 | 23.0% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1989 Q3 | 3.4% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1992 | 24.2% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1995 | 25.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1995 | 3.2% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 1998 | 28.0% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2000 | 30.1% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2000 | 3.1% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2002 | 28.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2004 | 29.3% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2004 | 2.9% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2006 | 30.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2006 | 2.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2007 Q3 | 31.0% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2008 Q4 | 2.4% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2009 Q1 | 27.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2010 | 28.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2010 | 1.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2012 | 29.4% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2014 | 30.1% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2014 | 1.9% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2016 | 29.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2016 | 2.0% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2018 | 30.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2019 Q4 | 30.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2019 Q4 | 2.2% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2020 Q2 | 29.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2020 Q2 | 2.4% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2020 Q4 | 30.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2021 Q2 | 31.2% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2021 Q4 | 2.7% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2022 Q2 | 30.1% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2022 Q4 | 2.6% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2023 Q4 | 30.8% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2023 Q4 | 2.6% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2024 Q1 | 30.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2024 Q1 | 2.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2024 Q4 | 2.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2025 Q2 | 31.0% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2025 Q3 | 31.7% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Top 1%, live FRED estimate | 2026-04-01 | 32.5% | Fresh | FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis |
| Top 1%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2026 Q2 | 32.5% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
| Bottom 50%, Federal Reserve DFA | 2026 Q2 | 2.3% | Fresh | Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts |
- State
- Date
- Source
- Rights
- Key
Who owns corporate stock
Share of all U.S. corporate equities and mutual funds owned by the top 1% and by the bottom 50%.
The top 1% held 40% of corporate equities and mutual funds in 2002 and 50% in 2024; the bottom 50% held 1% in 2024.
No reading for the bottom 50% in 2002 is on file.
Show the 3 readings
| Group | Year | Share of stock |
|---|---|---|
| Top 1% | 2002 | 40% |
| Top 1% | 2024 | 50% |
| Bottom 50% | 2024 | 1% |
The price of a seat on the Forbes 400
Net worth needed to make the list, and the list's average, in 2024 dollars. The years shown are the readings the source publishes.
- Cheapest seat on the list
- Average member
In 2024 dollars, the cheapest seat on the Forbes 400 cost $0.24B in 1982 and $3.30B in 2024, 14 times as much.
Show the 6 readings
| Year | Cheapest seat | Average member |
|---|---|---|
| 1982 | $0.24B | $0.73B |
| 2000 | $0.71B | $1.80B |
| 2010 | $1B | $3.80B |
| 2015 | $1.70B | $5.80B |
| 2020 | $2.10B | $7.50B |
| 2024 | $3.30B | $13B |
Food-at-home CPI: Sep 2026
Paychecks against grocery prices, Apr 2025 to Sep 2026
Each dot is one month, joined in time order from Apr 25 to Sep 26. Above the dashed line, earnings rose faster than grocery prices; below it, slower.
From Apr 25 to Sep 26 average hourly earnings rose 4.7% and grocery prices rose 3.1%: earnings ahead of the other by 1.6 points. One item is not the cost of living.
State of Paychecks against grocery prices, Apr 2025 to Sep 2026
- Fresh
- Not available
- Hourly earnings are nominal, for production and nonsupervisory employees in the total private sector. Food-at-home prices are the seasonally adjusted CPI-U index.
- Oct 25 has no paired reading and is marked on the month rug below the plot. The line breaks there instead of bridging the gap.
Show the 13 monthly readings
| Month | Food-at-home price index | Hourly earnings index | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 25 | 100 (CPI 311.44) | 100 ($36.12 an hour) | Fresh |
| May 25 | 100.3 (CPI 312.30) | 100.4 ($36.28 an hour) | Fresh |
| Jun 25 | 100.5 (CPI 312.98) | 100.7 ($36.36 an hour) | Fresh |
| Jul 25 | 100.5 (CPI 313.04) | 101 ($36.47 an hour) | Fresh |
| Aug 25 | 101 (CPI 314.65) | 101.4 ($36.62 an hour) | Fresh |
| Sep 25 | 101.3 (CPI 315.54) | 101.6 ($36.70 an hour) | Fresh |
| Oct 25 | Not available | Not available | Not available: No food-at-home price reading is on file for October 2025: the federal shutdown interrupted BLS data collection that month. The line is not drawn across it. |
| Nov 25 | 101.1 (CPI 315) | 102.4 ($37 an hour) | Fresh |
| Dec 25 | 101.8 (CPI 316.98) | 102.5 ($37.02 an hour) | Fresh |
| Jan 26 | 102 (CPI 317.59) | 102.9 ($37.15 an hour) | Fresh |
| Feb 26 | 102.4 (CPI 318.99) | 103.2 ($37.29 an hour) | Fresh |
| Mar 26 | 102.3 (CPI 318.46) | 103.5 ($37.38 an hour) | Fresh |
| Sep 26 | 103.1 (CPI 321.11) | 104.7 ($37.81 an hour) | Fresh |
Three eras, five measures
The same measures for the first Gilded Age, the postwar low and today. Cells marked as estimates are reconstructions, not measurements.
Show the comparison table
| Measure | First Gilded Age peak (~1900) | Postwar low (~1975) | Today (2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top 1% wealth share | ~27-30% (est.) | ~20% (est.) | 31.7% (RECORD HIGH in Fed's data series) |
| Top 10% wealth share | ~70-90% (est.) | ~52% (est.) | 67.2% |
| Billionaire count | n/a (term not yet coined; comparable: ~50 'ultra-rich' families) | ~5 (Forbes list not yet created; estimates from estate data) | 905 (combined $7.8T) |
| CEO-to-worker pay ratio | n/a (ratio not tracked; Gilded Age industrial wages ~$500/yr; Carnegie net worth ~$310B in 2023 dollars) | ~25:1 (EPI; between 21:1 in 1965 and 31:1 in 1978) | 281:1 |
| Billionaire election spending | Untracked (direct corporate and machine-boss purchasing of legislators documented; no FEC) | Minimal; pre-Citizens United; top individual donors ~$1-5M cycles | $2.6B in 2024 (1-in-6 federal election dollars; 160x Citizens United baseline) |
Historical estimates from Census property records, estate inventories. Sources: [140][141]
Also tracked in this chapter
Chapter II
The severed wage
Since 1978 net productivity rose to 181 on an index that started at 100, and typical worker pay rose to 126. By 2024 the two lines stand 55 index points apart.
Output rose. Pay did not follow.
Net productivity and typical worker pay on one index, 1978 = 100. Both lines share one scale.
- Net productivity
- Typical worker pay
Between 1978 and 2024 net productivity rose 81% and typical worker pay rose 26%: on the same index the two lines end 55 points apart.
Both lines are on one scale and one index, 1978 = 100. The source publishes 12 years, marked with dots; straight lines join them and the years between are not measured.
CEO pay on the same index reached 1,194 in 2024. It is left out of the drawing because on this scale it would press the two lines above into the bottom of the plot. It is in the table and in the ledger below, and Fig. 5 draws it as a ratio to worker pay.
From the source: CEO pay uses realized compensation measure. Worker pay = average annual compensation of production/nonsupervisory workers. Productivity = net economywide productivity.
Show the 12 readings
| Year | Net productivity | Typical worker pay | CEO pay |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1978 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1980 | 102 | 101 | 110 |
| 1985 | 109 | 101 | 135 |
| 1990 | 116 | 104 | 200 |
| 1995 | 122 | 107 | 335 |
| 2000 | 140 | 114 | 980 |
| 2005 | 155 | 116 | 725 |
| 2010 | 163 | 115 | 560 |
| 2015 | 170 | 119 | 820 |
| 2019 | 175 | 122 | 960 |
| 2021 | 178 | 125 | 1,200 |
| 2024 | 181 | 126 | 1,194 |
What the boss is paid for each dollar the worker is
Average CEO pay at the 350 largest U.S. firms as a multiple of average pay for a typical production or nonsupervisory worker in those industries.
At the 350 largest U.S. firms the average CEO was paid 21 times a typical worker in 1965 and 281 times in 2024. The highest reading on file is 399 times in 2021.
The bars are the 24 years the source publishes, out of the 60 from 1965 to 2024. The gaps between bars are not equal spans of time.
The realized measure counts stock awards and options when they are cashed in, not when they are granted, so the ratio moves with the stock market. For 2023 the source also gives a granted-measure ratio of 192 to 1 against 290 to 1 realized.
Show the 24 readings
| Year | CEO to typical worker |
|---|---|
| 1965 | 21 to 1 |
| 1968 | 22 to 1 |
| 1973 | 26 to 1 |
| 1978 | 31 to 1 |
| 1980 | 33 to 1 |
| 1983 | 37 to 1 |
| 1989 | 60 to 1 |
| 1992 | 82 to 1 |
| 1995 | 131 to 1 |
| 1998 | 248 to 1 |
| 2000 | 380 to 1 |
| 2002 | 188 to 1 |
| 2004 | 213 to 1 |
| 2007 | 329 to 1 |
| 2009 | 181 to 1 |
| 2012 | 202 to 1 |
| 2014 | 234 to 1 |
| 2017 | 261 to 1 |
| 2019 | 320 to 1 |
| 2020 | 351 to 1 |
| 2021 | 399 to 1 |
| 2022 | 272 to 1 |
| 2023 | 290 to 1 |
| 2024 | 281 to 1 |
The same economy, felt differently by income
University of Michigan consumer sentiment, households split into thirds by income.
- Top third of households by income
- Middle third
- Bottom third
From Jan 2026 to Mar 2026 the top third's reading fell 7.5 points and the bottom third's fell 1.7 points, so the gap between them narrowed from 21.3 to 15.5 points.
Only 3 monthly readings are on file for each group, so this figure shows a change over that span and does not show a trend.
Households are split into thirds by income. Each line is the University of Michigan sentiment index for that third.
Show the 3 readings
| Month | Bottom third | Middle third | Top third |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2026 | 47.2 | 56.1 | 68.5 |
| Feb 2026 | 46.8 | 55.4 | 67 |
| Mar 2026 | 45.5 | 52 | 61 |
Also tracked in this chapter
Chapter III
What concentration buys
Billionaire spending on federal elections rose from 18 million dollars in 2000 to 2600 million in 2024, 144.4 times the earlier figure.
Where the outside money is parked
Cash on hand at the end of 2025 for the super PACs and outside groups that report it, in millions of dollars.
MAGA Inc held $304M in cash at the end of 2025, the most of the 6 groups that report it. Together the 6 held $793.5M.
Only groups with a cash-on-hand reading for the end of 2025 are drawn. 5 groups report a different measure (cash on hand (date not given), raised in 2025, commitment, raised, contributed in 2025), which is not comparable with cash on hand, so they are in the table and not on the axis.
Each group is described in its own words in the table. Nothing here is coloured by party.
Show all 11 groups and their own measures
| Group | Described as | Measure | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAGA Inc | Republican/Trump super PAC | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $304M |
| Fairshake | Crypto industry (bipartisan) | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $193M |
| Senate Leadership Fund | Republican Senate (Thune) | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $100M |
| United Democracy Project | Pro-Israel/AIPAC (plays in D primaries) | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $96M |
| Congressional Leadership Fund | Republican House (Johnson) | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $54.5M |
| House Majority PAC | Democratic House | Cash on hand, end of 2025 | $46M |
| Senate Majority PAC | Democratic Senate (Schumer) | Raised in 2025 | $59M |
| Leading the Future | Pro-AI industry (bipartisan) | Cash on hand (date not given) | $50M |
| America PAC | Musk personal PAC | Contributed in 2025 | $48M |
| American Priorities | Progressive counter-AIPAC (new 2026) | Commitment | $10M |
| Pine Tree Results | Anti-Collins (ME-specific) | Raised | $10M |
Billionaire money in federal elections
Estimated spending by billionaires and the ultra-wealthy in each federal election cycle the source totals, in millions of dollars.
Billionaires spent $18M in federal elections in 2000 and $2.6B in 2024, which the source puts at 16.5% of all spending that cycle.
The bars are the 8 election years the source gives a total for. The gaps between bars are not equal spans of time.
No total is on file for 2010, so no bar is drawn for it. The source marks it as the year of the Citizens United decision.
The source labels 2012, 2016, 2018, 2022 as estimates. The tallies come from different publishers and methods, so a difference between two years is not a like-for-like change. Each reading's own note is in the table.
Show the 9 readings and their notes
| Cycle | Spending | Share of all spending | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | $18M | 0.6% | Billionaire election spending $18M; 0.6% of total political contributions. inequality.org |
| 2008 | $16.6M | Not available | Last election before Citizens United. Lowest-ranked top-100 billionaire donor in 2024 spent $5.2M - roughly what the highest-ranked gave in 2008. |
| 2010 | Not available | Not available | Citizens United decision (Jan 2010) unlocks unlimited independent expenditures. Inflection point. |
| 2012 | $140M | Not available | First post-Citizens United presidential cycle. Americans for Tax Fairness estimate. |
| 2016 | $370M | Not available | Americans for Tax Fairness estimate. |
| 2018 | $600M | Not available | ATF estimate. Midterm cycle. Top 1% of donors provided 96% of all super PAC funds. |
| 2020 | $1,000M | Not available | ~$1B by individual billionaire donors. |
| 2022 | $1,200M | Not available | Midterm cycle. ATF estimate. |
| 2024 | $2,600M | 16.5% | 100 billionaire families; record $2.6B; 1-in-6 dollars in federal elections. 70% to Republican candidates. Musk: $294M (single largest donor). Top 10 billionaire families: $953M+. 160x increase since Citizens United. |
Party committee fundraising, full year 2025
Show the committee table
| Committee | Full year 2025 |
|---|---|
| Republican National Committee | $172M |
| Democratic National Committee | $146M |
| Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee | $80M |
| All Republican committees, total | $378M |
| All Democratic committees, total | $341M |
| Democratic National Committee debt | $17.5M |
GOP outraised Dems $378M to $341M. Bulk of gap at national committee level.
Illinois primary PAC scorecard, March 17, 2026
The first major 2026 test of outside money in House primaries. Outside groups spent $50M across all the races.
Show the scorecard
| Group | Races | Won | Lost | Spent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIPAC and the United Democracy Project | 4 | 2 | 2 | $21M |
| Fairshake (crypto industry) | 3 | 1 | 2 | $13.3M |
| Leading the Future (AI industry) | 2 | 1 | 1 | $2.4M |
Open seats from retirements and resignations
6 announced. Newest announcement first.
Source: Ballotpedia and Associated Press (not an official record)
Show the 6 open seats
| State | Seat | Party | Incumbent | Announced |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Montana | Senate | R | Steve Daines | 2026-03-04 |
| Iowa | Senate | R | Joni Ernst | 2025-09-01 |
| Minnesota | Senate | D | Tina Smith | 2025-01-01 |
| Michigan | Senate | D | Gary Peters | 2025-01-01 |
| New Hampshire | Senate | D | Jeanne Shaheen | 2025-01-01 |
| Kentucky | Senate | R | Mitch McConnell | 2024-02-28 |
Chapter IV
The household squeeze
Consumer sentiment fell from 57 to 53.3 between Mar 2025 and Mar 2026, while annual consumer price inflation rose from 2.4 percent to 3.7 percent.
Prices, work, sentiment and the Fed
Four indicators of how households are doing, each on its own scale and with its own date.
Fell from 9.1% in Jun 2022. High 9.1% in Jun 2022, low 2.4% in Sep 2024. 13 readings.
Rose from 4% in Jan 2022. High 4.4% in Feb 2026, low 3.4% in Jan 2023. 15 readings.
Rose from 50 in Jun 2022. High 71.8 in Nov 2024, low 50 in Jun 2022. 13 readings.
Fell from 5% in Sep 18, 2024. High 5% in Sep 18, 2024, low 3.75% in Sep 17, 2025. 14 readings.
Each panel is scaled on its own readings and stamps its own date. Compare direction across panels, not height.
Each panel is drawn from its own lowest to its highest reading, so the panels show direction and not relative size. The four quantities have different units, so they do not share an axis.
Readings are placed by date. The sources publish irregularly, so the spacing between marks is uneven and the lines do not show what happened between readings.
Not yet published, and so not drawn: Consumer prices, change on a year earlier: Jan 2026; Consumer prices, change on a year earlier: Mar 2026; Unemployment rate: Jan 2026; Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan: Jan 2026. A release that has not happened is not a zero.
The federal funds panel marks each meeting at which the target was set. The rate holds between meetings.
Show the 59 readings behind the four panels
| Indicator | Date | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Jun 2022 | 9.1% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Dec 2022 | 6.5% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Jun 2023 | 3% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Dec 2023 | 3.4% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Jun 2024 | 3% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Sep 2024 | 2.4% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Dec 2024 | 2.9% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Mar 2025 | 2.4% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Jun 2025 | 2.6% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Sep 2025 | 2.5% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Dec 2025 | 2.4% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Feb 2026 | 2.4% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Sep 2026 | 3.7% |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Jan 2026 | Not yet published |
| Consumer prices, change on a year earlier | Mar 2026 | Not yet published |
| Unemployment rate | Jan 2022 | 4% |
| Unemployment rate | Jul 2022 | 3.5% |
| Unemployment rate | Jan 2023 | 3.4% |
| Unemployment rate | Jul 2023 | 3.5% |
| Unemployment rate | Jan 2024 | 3.7% |
| Unemployment rate | Apr 2024 | 3.9% |
| Unemployment rate | Jul 2024 | 4.3% |
| Unemployment rate | Oct 2024 | 4.1% |
| Unemployment rate | Dec 2024 | 4.1% |
| Unemployment rate | Mar 2025 | 4% |
| Unemployment rate | Jun 2025 | 4% |
| Unemployment rate | Sep 2025 | 4.1% |
| Unemployment rate | Dec 2025 | 4.2% |
| Unemployment rate | Feb 2026 | 4.4% |
| Unemployment rate | Sep 2026 | 4.2% |
| Unemployment rate | Jan 2026 | Not yet published |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jun 2022 | 50 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Dec 2022 | 59.7 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jun 2023 | 64.4 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Dec 2023 | 69.7 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jun 2024 | 68.2 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Nov 2024 | 71.8 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jan 2025 | 71.1 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Mar 2025 | 57 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jun 2025 | 62 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Sep 2025 | 60 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Dec 2025 | 58 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Feb 2026 | 56.6 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Mar 2026 | 53.3 |
| Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan | Jan 2026 | Not yet published |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Sep 18, 2024 | 5% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Nov 7, 2024 | 4.75% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Dec 18, 2024 | 4.50% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Mar 19, 2025 | 4.25% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Jun 18, 2025 | 4% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Sep 17, 2025 | 3.75% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Nov 5, 2025 | 3.75% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Jan 29, 2026 | 3.75% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Mar 18, 2026 | 3.75% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Oct 14, 2026 | 4% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Oct 15, 2026 | 4% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Oct 16, 2026 | 4% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Oct 17, 2026 | 4% |
| Federal funds target, upper bound | Oct 18, 2026 | 4% |
Energy stocks against the market
Percentage return since January 1 for energy stocks and for the S&P 500, on one scale.
- Energy stocks (XLE)
- S&P 500 (SPY)
By Mar 31, 2026 energy stocks were 41% up for the year and the S&P 500 was 5% down: a gap of 46 points, up from 1.4 on Feb 28, 2026.
Both lines are percentage returns since January 1, not an index, and they share one scale. Only the snapshots on file are marked; straight lines join them and the days between are not measured.
Show the 6 snapshots
| Date | Energy stocks | S&P 500 | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2026 | +3.5% | +2.1% | 1.4 points |
| Mar 7, 2026 | +12% | -1.5% | 13.5 points |
| Mar 14, 2026 | +18% | -3% | 21 points |
| Mar 21, 2026 | +25% | -4% | 29 points |
| Mar 28, 2026 | +32% | -5% | 37 points |
| Mar 31, 2026 | +41% | -5% | 46 points |
Also tracked in this chapter
Show the 112 readings behind the ledger
| Series | Date | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q1 2022 | -1.6% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q2 2022 | -0.6% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q3 2022 | +3.2% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q4 2022 | +2.6% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q1 2023 | +2.2% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q2 2023 | +2.1% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q3 2023 | +4.9% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q4 2023 | +3.4% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q1 2024 | +1.6% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q2 2024 | +3% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q3 2024 | +3.1% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q4 2024 | +2.4% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q1 2025 | +2.3% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q2 2025 | +2% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q3 2025 | +2.4% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q4 2025 | +0.7% |
| Real GDP growth, annualised | Q2 2026 | +2.2% |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Dec 2023 | +216,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Mar 2024 | +315,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Jun 2024 | +206,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Sep 2024 | +254,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Dec 2024 | +256,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Mar 2025 | +228,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Jun 2025 | +206,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Sep 2025 | +180,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Dec 2025 | +150,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Feb 2026 | -92,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Sep 2026 | +29,000 |
| Nonfarm payroll change, jobs | Jan 2026 | Not yet published |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Dec 2024 | 2.6% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Q1 2025 | 2.5% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Q2 2025 | 2.6% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Q3 2025 | 2.7% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Q4 2025 | 2.9% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Aug 2026 | 3.4% |
| PCE price index, change on a year earlier | Goldman forecast Dec 2026 | 2.9% (forecast, not drawn) |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Jan 2025 | 15% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Apr 5, 2025 | 35% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Apr 9, 2025 | 45% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Jul 2025 | 25% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Oct 2025 | 20% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Jan 2026 | 15% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Mar 4, 2026 | 20% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Mar 12, 2026 | 20% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Mar 15, 2026 | 25% |
| Recession probability, next twelve months | Mar 25, 2026 | 30% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Feb 28, 2026 | 4.15% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 2, 2026 | 4.05% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 3, 2026 | 4.06% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 4, 2026 | 4.09% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 5, 2026 | 4.13% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 6, 2026 | 4.15% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 7, 2026 | 4.22% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 9, 2026 | 4.12% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 10, 2026 | 4.15% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 11, 2026 | 4.21% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 12, 2026 | 4.27% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 13, 2026 | 4.28% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 14, 2026 | 4.28% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 16, 2026 | 4.23% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 17, 2026 | 4.20% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 18, 2026 | 4.26% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 19, 2026 | 4.25% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 20, 2026 | 4.39% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 21, 2026 | 4.35% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 23, 2026 | 4.34% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 24, 2026 | 4.39% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 25, 2026 | 4.33% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 26, 2026 | 4.42% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 27, 2026 | 4.44% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 28, 2026 | 4.44% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 30, 2026 | 4.35% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Mar 31, 2026 | 4.30% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 2, 2026 | 4.31% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 2026 | 4.33% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 3, 2026 | 4.35% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 6, 2026 | 4.34% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 7, 2026 | 4.33% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 8, 2026 | 4.29% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 9, 2026 | 4.29% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 10, 2026 | 4.31% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 13, 2026 | 4.30% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 14, 2026 | 4.26% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 15, 2026 | 4.29% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Apr 16, 2026 | 4.32% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Oct 9, 2026 | 5.24% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Oct 13, 2026 | 5.21% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Oct 14, 2026 | 5.19% |
| 10-year Treasury yield | Oct 15, 2026 | 5.10% |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Feb 28, 2026 | 0.15 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Mar 7, 2026 | 0.12 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Mar 14, 2026 | 0.08 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Mar 21, 2026 | 0.05 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Mar 28, 2026 | 0.03 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Oct 13, 2026 | 0.42 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Oct 14, 2026 | 0.37 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Oct 15, 2026 | 0.33 points |
| 2-year to 10-year Treasury spread | Oct 16, 2026 | 0.35 points |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Sep 2025 | 2.7% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Oct 2025 | 2.7% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Nov 2025 | 2.6% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Dec 2025 | 2.8% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Jan 2026 | 3.3% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Feb 2026 | 3.4% |
| Inflation expectations, one year ahead | Mar 2026 | 3.8% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Sep 2025 | 3.1% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Oct 2025 | 3% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Nov 2025 | 3.2% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Dec 2025 | 3% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Jan 2026 | 3.2% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Feb 2026 | 3.3% |
| Inflation expectations, five years ahead | Mar 2026 | 3.2% |
Chapter V
The energy shock
The national average price of a gallon of gasoline rose 135 cents between Feb 26, 2026 and Oct 12, 2026, from 2.98 dollars to 4.33 dollars.
What a gallon costs
National average price of regular gasoline, dollars a gallon.
Regular gasoline averaged $2.98 on Feb 26, 2026, the last reading before the war began on Feb 28, 2026. It peaked at $4.35 on Oct 5, 2026 and stood at $4.33 on Oct 12, 2026, 135 cents above the pre-war reading.
Drawn are the 55 readings from Nov 3, 2025 on: a mix of weekly and daily values. The 23 earlier rows are yearly averages and seasonal snapshots, not weekly prices, so they are in the table and not on the line.
4 of the drawn readings are marked estimated in the source.
The dated events are listed in the table below the figure, in order. They are not flagged on the line.
Show the 78 price readings
| Date | Price | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 1, 2019 | $2.25 | 2019 annual avg. Source: AAA/EIA. |
| Jan 1, 2020 | $2.17 | 2020 annual avg. COVID suppressed demand. Source: AAA/EIA. |
| Jan 1, 2021 | $2.33 | 2021 start. Rose to $3.41 annual avg. Source: AAA/EIA. |
| Jun 1, 2021 | $3.07 | 2021 mid-year; recovery demand surge. Source: AAA. |
| Dec 1, 2021 | $3.28 | 2021 year-end. Source: AAA. |
| Jan 1, 2022 | $3.32 | Pre-Ukraine-invasion baseline. Source: AAA. |
| Mar 7, 2022 | $4.17 | Russia invades Ukraine (Feb 24); gas surging. Source: AAA. |
| Jun 13, 2022 | $5.02 | All-time record national average. Source: AAA. |
| Sep 1, 2022 | $3.76 | SPR release + demand pullback. Source: AAA. |
| Dec 1, 2022 | $3.21 | Year-end decline. Source: AAA. |
| Jan 1, 2023 | $3.27 | 2023 start. Source: AAA. |
| Apr 1, 2023 | $3.60 | Spring seasonal rise. Source: AAA. |
| Sep 18, 2023 | $3.88 | 2023 peak; highest since Oct 2022. Source: AAA. |
| Dec 1, 2023 | $3.15 | Year-end decline. Source: AAA. |
| Jan 1, 2024 | $3.07 | 2024 start. Source: AAA. |
| Apr 15, 2024 | $3.63 | Spring 2024 seasonal high. Source: AAA. |
| Jul 1, 2024 | $3.50 | Mid-2024. Source: AAA. |
| Sep 1, 2024 | $3.33 | Pre-election decline. Source: AAA. |
| Dec 1, 2024 | $3.01 | Year-end 2024; falling toward $2.80s. Source: AAA. |
| Jan 1, 2025 | $2.98 | 2025 start; continued decline. Source: AAA. |
| Apr 1, 2025 | $3.15 | Spring 2025 seasonal. Source: AAA estimate. |
| Jul 1, 2025 | $3.25 | Mid-2025. Source: AAA estimate. |
| Oct 1, 2025 | $3.05 | Fall 2025 decline. Source: AAA estimate. |
| Nov 3, 2025 | $3.02 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Nov 10, 2025 | $3.06 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Nov 17, 2025 | $3.06 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Nov 24, 2025 | $3.06 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Dec 1, 2025 | $2.98 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Dec 8, 2025 | $2.94 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Dec 15, 2025 | $2.90 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Dec 22, 2025 | $2.84 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Dec 29, 2025 | $2.81 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Jan 1, 2026 | $2.83 | |
| Jan 5, 2026 | $2.80 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Jan 8, 2026 | $2.81 | |
| Jan 12, 2026 | $2.78 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Jan 15, 2026 | $2.84 | |
| Jan 19, 2026 | $2.81 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Jan 22, 2026 | $2.84 | Estimated; stable per AAA |
| Jan 26, 2026 | $2.85 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Jan 29, 2026 | $2.85 | Estimated; stable per AAA |
| Feb 2, 2026 | $2.87 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Feb 5, 2026 | $2.87 | Estimated; beginning seasonal rise |
| Feb 9, 2026 | $2.90 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Feb 12, 2026 | $2.89 | Estimated |
| Feb 16, 2026 | $2.92 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Feb 19, 2026 | $2.92 | SOTU reference price |
| Feb 23, 2026 | $2.94 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Feb 26, 2026 | $2.98 | Seasonal rise underway; summer-blend transition |
| Mar 2, 2026 | $3.02 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Mar 5, 2026 | $3.25 | Jumped ~27 cents in one week; Iran war impact |
| Mar 9, 2026 | $3.50 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Mar 12, 2026 | $3.60 | Jumped ~35 cents; spring break + war |
| Mar 15, 2026 | $3.70 | Up ~27% from pre-war $2.92 |
| Mar 16, 2026 | $3.72 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Mar 18, 2026 | $3.84 | Highest since Sep 2023. Up ~32% from pre-war $2.92. Diesel nearing $5.07 (highest since 2022). CA $5.56. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | $3.88 | Up 28c in one week per AAA; highest since Sep 2023; up 33% from pre-war $2.92 |
| Mar 20, 2026 | $3.91 | Highest since Sep 2023. GA first state to suspend gas tax (60-day). |
| Mar 22, 2026 | $3.94 | Up 35% from pre-war $2.92. United Airlines first major carrier to cut 5% capacity. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | $3.96 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Mar 24, 2026 | $3.98 | 24th consecutive daily increase; MI crossed $4.01; up $1.06 in one month |
| Mar 25, 2026 | $3.98 | Unchanged from Mar 24. Highest since 2022. EIA weekly $4.096 for wk of Mar 23. |
| Mar 26, 2026 | $3.98 | Up $1.00 in one month (AAA press release: from $2.98 Feb 26 to $3.98 Mar 26). Could hit $4 'in coming days' — first time since Aug 2022. |
| Mar 28, 2026 | $3.98 | AAA Mar 28. Conflicting reads $3.977-$3.981. Effectively flat from prior day. Up $1.06 from pre-war $2.92. |
| Mar 30, 2026 | $3.99 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Mar 31, 2026 | $4.02 | Crossed $4 for first time since Aug 2022; diesel $5.45 |
| Apr 1, 2026 | $4.06 | AAA daily; up from $4.018 Mar 31; $1.08 monthly increase (record) |
| Apr 2, 2026 | $4.06 | AAA data is 1 day behind |
| Apr 4, 2026 | $4.10 | AAA April 4 2026. First time national average exceeded $4 since August 2022. Track B fetch failed; Track A authoritative. |
| Apr 5, 2026 | $4.11 | AAA national average. First time exceeded $4/gal in four years. |
| Apr 6, 2026 | $4.12 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Apr 7, 2026 | $4.14 | AAA national average. Track B gas_aaa_weekly fetch failed; Track A value used as authoritative. First time national average exceeded $4/gal in four years. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | $4.16 | AAA Gas Prices. First time in four years national average exceeded $4/gal (threshold crossed April 2, 2026). Track B fetch failed; Track A value used. |
| Apr 9, 2026 | $4.17 | AAA national average; first time exceeded $4 since August 2022 |
| Apr 10, 2026 | $4.15 | Track B gas_aaa_weekly fetch failed (page_content_empty); Track A AAA value of $4.153/gal used as authoritative. |
| Apr 13, 2026 | $4.12 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon |
| Oct 5, 2026 | $4.35 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon. NOT an AAA figure — the chart-series name is a legacy misnomer (deprecated alias of `gas_retail_weekly`); the underlying source has always been EIA/FRED GASREGW. |
| Oct 12, 2026 | $4.33 | Weekly US regular all-formulations retail gasoline price per gallon. NOT an AAA figure — the chart-series name is a legacy misnomer (deprecated alias of `gas_retail_weekly`); the underlying source has always been EIA/FRED GASREGW. |
Show the 28 dated events, in order
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 3, 2020 | US kills Soleimani; oil spikes briefly to $69 |
| Mar 9, 2020 | Saudi-Russia price war; oil crashes |
| Apr 20, 2020 | WTI goes negative (-$37.63); COVID demand collapse |
| Feb 24, 2022 | Russia invades Ukraine; oil surges past $100 |
| Mar 8, 2022 | US bans Russian oil imports; Brent $128 |
| Mar 31, 2022 | Biden authorizes 180M barrel SPR release (largest ever) |
| Oct 7, 2023 | Hamas attack on Israel; brief oil spike |
| Apr 13, 2024 | Iran drone/missile attack on Israel; oil briefly $92 |
| Feb 1, 2025 | Trump 10% China tariffs + 25% Canada/Mexico tariffs announced |
| Apr 2, 2025 | Trump Liberation Day tariffs (reciprocal tariffs announced) |
| Feb 4, 2026 | SOTU (gas $2.92) |
| Feb 28, 2026 | Iran war begins |
| Mar 5, 2026 | Hormuz effectively shut; oil spikes to ~$120 |
| Mar 8, 2026 | Mojtaba Khamenei elected Supreme Leader |
| Mar 10, 2026 | Trump signals faster end; oil pullback to ~$88 |
| Mar 13, 2026 | Kharg Island struck (90+ targets) |
| Mar 14, 2026 | IEA SPR release (400M bbl) |
| Mar 16, 2026 | UK, Germany, EU decline Hormuz naval coalition; IEA: largest supply disruption in oil market history |
| Mar 18, 2026 | Israel strikes South Pars gas field (world largest, shared with Qatar). Iran retaliates against Ras Laffan LNG, Saudi refineries, UAE. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | Israel strikes Caspian Sea naval targets (first time); Netanyahu claims helping reopen Hormuz; oil reverses from $119 to $108.65 |
| Mar 20, 2026 | Iraq force majeure on all foreign oilfields; Iran struck Ras Laffan (17% LNG cut) and Kuwait refinery; GA suspends gas tax; IRGC spokesman killed; F-35 hit by Iranian fire |
| Mar 22, 2026 | Trump 48-hour ultimatum: obliterate Iran power plants if Hormuz not reopened. Iran vows indefinite Hormuz closure and destruction of all regional energy/water infrastructure. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | Trump postpones power plant strikes 5 days, claims Iran talks; oil crashes 7%+ intraday |
| Mar 24, 2026 | Oil rebounds +4.5% to ~$104 after Monday's 11% crash; Iran charging Hormuz transit fees up to $2M/vessel (Bloomberg); Philippines declares energy emergency; 82nd Airborne deploying |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Oil falls 2.2% to ~$102 on talks. Iran rejects US 15-point plan, issues 5-point counter including Hormuz control. Kuwait airport drone attack. GCC demands seat at negotiations. |
| Mar 28, 2026 | Houthis enter war with ballistic missile strikes on Israel. Prince Sultan Air Base attacked (12-15 US wounded). USS Tripoli arrives with 3,500 Marines. |
| Mar 30, 2026 | Trump threatens to obliterate Iran's energy infrastructure. Brent 55% monthly gain (record). Powell: rates 'good place.' |
| Mar 31, 2026 | Pentagon: B-52s over Iran, 'negotiate with bombs.' Pakistan-China 5-pt peace plan. Pezeshkian may accept deal. May Brent expired ~$119 (60%+ record monthly surge). |
The cost of the campaign so far
Gasoline and U.S. military deaths since the war began, each on its own scale.
$2.98 on Feb 26, 2026, the last reading before the war. 30 readings.
12 reports, revised down as well as up. Each is a report, not a running count.
Each panel is scaled on its own readings and stamps its own date. Compare direction across panels, not height.
The killed panel is not a cumulative count. The Defense Department and news reports revised the total down as well as up, and each mark is the total as that report gave it.
Reported without a non-hostile count, so not added into the drawn total: Apr 2, 2026 (15 killed in hostile action).
Approval is not drawn. The only running polling average on file has a single reading, and the individual polls ask different questions of different samples, so no line is drawn through them. They are printed below.
Show all 13 casualty reports
| Report date | Killed, hostile | Killed, non-hostile | Wounded | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2026 | 0 | 0 | 0 | War begins |
| Mar 9, 2026 | 0 | 0 | Not reported | No KIA reported as of Day 9 |
| Mar 12, 2026 | 7 | 0 | 140 | 5 from 103rd Sustainment Command, Des Moines IA |
| Mar 14, 2026 | 13 | 6 | 140 | Nearly doubled in 2 days; non-hostile = KC-135 crash, western Iraq |
| Mar 17, 2026 | 13 | 6 | 140 | Day 17. US KIA unchanged. Tehran strikes continuing; thick black smoke over capital. Iran claims ~700 missiles and 3,600 drones launched since war began. Israel: thousands of targets remaining, not working to a timetable. Mojtaba Khamenei ceasefire terms (reparations + guarantees) not engaged. Allied Hormuz coalition: UK, Germany, EU all declined. Dubai airport briefly shut (drone fuel tank fire). Trump-China summit (Mar 31) may be delayed. |
| Mar 18, 2026 | 13 | 6 | 140 | Day 19. Iran strikes South Pars. Israel kills top security official. Oil $108+. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | 13 | 6 | 200 | Day 20. ~200 wounded (180 RTD). Lebanon deaths nearing 1,000. Iran deaths: HRANA documented 3,114 by Mar 17 including 1,354 civilians. Gulf state deaths 21+. |
| Mar 20, 2026 | 7 | 6 | 200 | Day 21. Cumulative. Israel strikes Caspian Sea and northern Iran (firsts). 2,500 Marines deploying. Lebanon >1,000 dead. Iran Red Crescent: 18,000+ injured. 2,200+ dead across region. |
| Mar 25, 2026 | 13 | 2 | 200 | Day 26. Unchanged. Lebanon 1,072 killed, 2,966 wounded. Iran 1,500+ dead (Health Ministry). 82nd Airborne deploying. |
| Mar 27, 2026 | 13 | 8 | 303 | Day 28. Arak reactor struck. Iran Red Crescent: ~1,900 dead, 20K injured. Lebanon 1,116. Regional total >3,000. 273 US wounded RTD. |
| Mar 28, 2026 | 13 | 2 | 315 | Day 29. 12-15 additional wounded in Prince Sultan Air Base attack (6 BMs + 29 drones). KC-135 destroyed. Total wounded now 315+. Iran: ~1,900 killed, 20K+ injured. Lebanon: 1,189 killed, 3,315 wounded. Iraq: 99. Israel: 19 civilians + 4 IDF. Regional deaths exceed 3,000. |
| Mar 31, 2026 | 7 | 6 | 300 | Pentagon briefing revised total to 13 KIA (6 Kuwait drone strike, 1 Saudi Arabia, 6 KC-135 crash Iraq), 300+ wounded. |
| Apr 2, 2026 | 15 | Not reported | 520 | Intercept reports 520+ wounded vs Pentagon 300+; 15 KIA confirmed (Wikipedia) |
Polls on the Iran campaign
Each poll asks its own question of its own sample, so none is joined to another. The question label is the source's, and the two figures are as the source recorded them under it; the note carries the detail.
Show the 11 polls
| Date | Pollster | Question | In favour | Opposed | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2026 | YouGov snap | Iran strikes | 34% | 44% | |
| Mar 1, 2026 | WaPo flash | Stop the war / continue it | 47% | 25% | |
| Mar 3, 2026 | NPR/Marist | Support military action | 44% | 56% | |
| Mar 14, 2026 | Quincy Institute/TAC/Ipsos | Trump voters only (804 2024 Trump voters) | 76% | 23% | 79% want quick end. Young MAGA 18-29: +8 support margin vs +53 overall. 55% concerned about gas prices. |
| Mar 17, 2026 | Emerson College | Support/oppose military action (LV) | 40% | 47% | T1 LV Mar 16-17. 47% oppose, 40% support, 13% unsure. 63% think world war likely (up from 55% Mar 2025). |
| Mar 19, 2026 | Reuters/Ipsos | Ground troops | 40% | Not reported | Mar 17-19, 1,545 adults. 65% expect ground troops, 7% support. Overall Trump approval 40%, unchanged from Feb 28. |
| Mar 20, 2026 | Daily Mail/JL Partners | Blame attribution | Not reported | Not reported | Mar 18-20. Independents oppose war 50-24. 54% would blame Trump for further gas price increases vs 20% blaming Iran. |
| Mar 22, 2026 | Pew Research | Handling | 37% | 61% | Mar 16-22, 3,524 adults. 59% say wrong decision. 45% not going well. 40% say US less safe. R-leaning independents split 52/45. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | Fox News/Beacon | Handling | 36% | 64% | Mar 20-23, 1,001 RV. 58% oppose war overall. R: 77% support (MAGA 90%, non-MAGA 52%). |
| Mar 24, 2026 | Reuters/Ipsos | Strikes disapprove | Not reported | 61% | 61% disapprove of strikes. 75% R approve, 93% D disapprove. |
| Mar 31, 2026 | Silver Bulletin avg | Sb average | Net -14.3 | SB Iran war polling average net -14.3, lowest since war began |
Also tracked in this chapter
Show the 6 farm-input readings
| Series | Date | Reading | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Farm diesel, delivered average | Mar 6, 2026 | $4.15 a gallon (regional range $3.45 to $5.10) | Pre-war baseline range |
| Farm diesel, delivered average | Mar 13, 2026 | $4.53 a gallon (regional range $3.60 to $5.60) | War week 2 |
| Farm diesel, delivered average | Mar 20, 2026 | $5.29 a gallon (regional range $3.97 to $6.35) | USDA AMS Farm Production Cost Report. Up $0.76 week-over-week. Farm diesel >$5 is a threshold number. Massive regional disparity. |
| Urea fertilizer | Jan 15, 2026 | $389 a ton | Early 2025 baseline (New Orleans) |
| Urea fertilizer | Mar 20, 2026 | $450 a ton | New Orleans. Three of top 10 global urea exporters ship through Hormuz. |
| Urea fertilizer | Mar 25, 2026 | $460 a ton | DTN/Progressive Farmer. 6 of 8 major fertilizers higher in third week of March. UAN28 up 15% MoM. DAP $851/ton (+11% YoY). |
Chapter VI
The verdict forming
Across 22 readings from Jun 1, 2025 the generic ballot average has run between 3 and 5.8 points, and it rose to a Democratic margin of 5.6 points at Apr 19, 2026.
Where the generic ballot stands
Democratic margin on the generic congressional ballot, in points. Above zero is a Democratic lead.
The average has run between +3 (Jun 1, 2025) and +5.8 (Apr 8, 2026) and stood at a Democratic margin of 5.6 points on Apr 19, 2026.
The line is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, in points. Above zero is a Democratic lead; below zero would be a Republican one.
Readings by publisher: 10 from Silver Bulletin, 8 with no publisher named in the row, 4 from RealClearPolitics. The line is spliced across them, and the individual polls are in the table and not on the line.
Show the 22 average readings
| Date | Democratic margin | Publisher | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 1, 2025 | +3 | Silver Bulletin | Mid-2025 baseline; Dems leading. Source: Silver Bulletin. |
| Aug 1, 2025 | +3.5 | Silver Bulletin | Summer 2025. Source: Silver Bulletin. |
| Oct 1, 2025 | +4 | Silver Bulletin | Fall 2025; widening. Source: Silver Bulletin. |
| Nov 15, 2025 | +4.5 | Silver Bulletin | Post-VA/NJ governors; environment solidifying. Source: Silver Bulletin. |
| Dec 1, 2025 | +5 | Silver Bulletin | Dec 2025; approaching D+5 threshold. Source: Silver Bulletin. |
| Jan 8, 2026 | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin | Tracker launch; D+5.3 (Silver Bulletin, Jan 8) |
| Jan 22, 2026 | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin | Stable at D+5.3 per Silver Bulletin Model Talk post |
| Feb 1, 2026 | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin | Fluctuating D+5.3 to D+5.6 since beginning of Feb (Silver Bulletin) |
| Feb 9, 2026 | +5.4 | Not named in the row | |
| Mar 4, 2026 | +5.4 | Not named in the row | |
| Mar 9, 2026 | +5.4 | Not named in the row | |
| Mar 12, 2026 | +5.5 | Not named in the row | No Iran war movement noted by Nate Silver |
| Mar 14, 2026 | +5.5 | Not named in the row | |
| Mar 16, 2026 | +5.5 | Not named in the row | Flat; no Iran war movement confirmed through Day 17 |
| Mar 25, 2026 | +5.1 | Not named in the row | D+5.1 (Mar 19 update). Down from D+5.4 prior week. Range D+5.0 to D+5.6 since start of year. |
| Mar 29, 2026 | +5.5 | Not named in the row | |
| Apr 7, 2026 | +5.7 | RealClearPolitics | RealClearPolitics generic ballot average. Democratic advantage. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | +5.8 | RealClearPolitics | RealClearPolling Generic Ballot Average, April 8, 2026. D+5.8. |
| Apr 9, 2026 | +5.4 | Silver Bulletin | Silver Bulletin generic ballot average; D+5.4 |
| Apr 10, 2026 | +5.4 | RealClearPolitics | RealClearPolling generic ballot average. Updated from 2026-04-09. |
| Apr 12, 2026 | +5.4 | RealClearPolitics | RealClearPolling Generic Ballot Average. Democratic advantage. |
| Apr 19, 2026 | +5.6 | Silver Bulletin | Dems 52.8 vs GOP 47.2 in Silver Bulletin two-way share |
Show the 16 individual polls
| Date | Pollster | Democratic margin | Screen | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 4, 2026 | Morning Consult | +5 | RV | Pre-cycle baseline |
| Feb 20, 2026 | Morning Consult | +3 | RV | |
| Feb 22, 2026 | Harvard-Harris | 0 | LV | FLAG: T3 outlier; prior month D+4 |
| Mar 5, 2026 | Morning Consult | +2 | RV | Independents D+11, moderates D+20 |
| Mar 10, 2026 | Ballotpedia avg | +4 | Not stated | Aggregator average |
| Mar 15, 2026 | Morning Consult | +3 | RV | Mar 9-15, 26,634 RV. D 45%, R 42%. Independents D+11, moderates D+21. |
| Mar 16, 2026 | Echelon Insights | +5 | RV | A-rated, Mar 12-16. D 49%, R 44%. 1-pt dip for D, 2-pt decline for R from prior month. |
| Mar 17, 2026 | Emerson College | +7 | LV | T1 LV, Mar 16-17. D 49%, R 42%. Independents D+18 (49-31). Hispanics D+21 (53-32). |
| Mar 22, 2026 | Survey 160 | +10 | RV | Methodological research poll. D+10. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | Global Strategy Group | +8 | LV | D+8 per Semafor. Commissioned poll - flag Tier 3. |
| Mar 24, 2026 | SIN/Verasight | +6 | RV | Mar 16-18; D+6 (49-43 RV); Morris: out-party gains avg 5 pts Feb-Nov in midterms |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Silver Bulletin | +5 | Not stated | Late-March Silver Bulletin commentary value cited for generic ballot |
| Apr 6, 2026 | Not named | +6 | Not stated | RealClearPolling average as of run date. Sign convention assumed Republican advantage per site convention. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | Not named | +5.8 | Not stated | RealClearPolitics Generic Ballot Average as of April 8, 2026. Sign convention: positive value indicates Democratic advantage (D+5.8). |
| Apr 10, 2026 | Silver Bulletin | +5.3 | Not stated | Weighted Silver Bulletin average in mid-April before recent movement |
| Apr 14, 2026 | Not named | +5.4 | Not stated | RealClearPolitics generic ballot average. Democratic advantage of +5.4 points. |
Fig. 12, special elections, is not drawn: fewer than two contests carry a numeric overperformance figure.
Across 6 House special elections this Congress with official results, Democrats ran an average of 18.2 points ahead of their districts' 2024 presidential margins.
Source: State election offices, official results. Counts the House specials this Congress on unchanged district lines; excludes races without exactly one Democrat and one Republican in the final round. Newest election Apr 16, 2026.
The wide, muted shape behind is the whole House map: every district's presidential-baseline margin, sourced from The Downballot and receipted at ingestion. The narrow, saturated shape in front is the contested front: the 43 races currently rated Tossup or Lean ( Cook Political Report, Race Ratings, with Sabato's Crystal Ball where unavailable; added May 18, 2026), whose baselines span R+16 to D+5, computed from the figure's own data. For the most current Cook Political Report ratings and analysis, see cookpolitical.com. No seat range is shown or implied; the House forecast range is withheld pending calibration.
Approval on the economy
Net approval of the president's handling of the economy, one mark per poll, in points.
Across 3 polls net approval on the economy ran from -42 (Reuters/Ipsos, Mar 24, 2026) to -16 (ABC/WaPo/Ipsos, Feb 22, 2026); the latest, Reuters/Ipsos on Mar 24, 2026, is -42.
Net approval is the share who approve minus the share who disapprove. Each mark is one poll. The pollsters, screens and sample sizes differ, so the line joins them in date order and does not show a trend between polls.
A poll that reports only the approve share has no net and is listed in the table and not drawn. So are the averages and the one inflation reading.
Show all 10 economy approval readings
| Date | Pollster | Approve | Disapprove | Net | In the drawing | Note from the source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 19, 2026 | Silver Bulletin | Not reported | Not reported | -34 | A different question (inflation): not drawn | Net approval on inflation at -34 per the same Silver Bulletin April 19 commentary |
| Dec 17, 2025 | NPR/PBS/Marist | 36% | 57% | -21 | Drawn | Lowest across both terms in Marist series; n=1440, Dec 8-11 |
| Dec 22, 2025 | CBS/YouGov | 37% | Not reported | Not reported | Approve share only: no net to draw | Approve only; 61% say Trump overstates economy; n=2300 |
| Feb 22, 2026 | ABC/WaPo/Ipsos | 41% | 57% | -16 | Drawn | Stable vs prior ABC/WaPo; tariffs 34/64, inflation 32/65; surveyed Feb 12-17; n=2589 |
| Jan 1, 2026 | Silver Bulletin topic avg | Not reported | Not reported | -21 | An average, not a poll: not drawn | Aggregator anchor: economy net approval entering 2026 |
| Jan 16, 2026 | CNN/SSRS | 39% | Not reported | Not reported | Approve share only: no net to draw | Economy within 3pts of 39% overall; economy cited as top issue by 2:1 margin; n=2496 |
| Jan 28, 2026 | Fox News | 40% | Not reported | Not reported | Approve share only: no net to draw | Also: inflation 35% approve, tariffs 37% approve; economy not net-positive |
| Mar 18, 2026 | RealClearPolitics average | 39.1% | 57.7% | -18.6 | An average, not a poll: not drawn | RealClearPolitics rolling average as of Mar 18 |
| Mar 24, 2026 | Reuters/Ipsos | Not reported | Not reported | -42 | Drawn | 29% approve economy (lowest ever across both terms); cost of living 25% approve |
| Mar 3, 2026 | NPR/PBS/Marist | 35% | Not reported | Not reported | Approve share only: no net to draw | New series low across both terms |
Approval and the ballot, side by side in time
Presidential net approval above, the Democratic generic-ballot margin below. One time axis; each plot has its own scale.
Presidential net approval, points
Generic ballot, Democratic margin, points
Over the same months presidential net approval went from -9.5 (Jun 1, 2025) to -16.6 (Apr 19, 2026) and the Democratic margin on the generic ballot from +3 to +5.6. The two plots share only the time axis; each has its own scale.
The figure puts two measures side by side in time. It makes no claim that either moves the other, and the plots are not overlaid on one axis so that no such claim is drawn.
Both lines are spliced averages. Approval readings: 15 from Silver Bulletin, 11 with no publisher named in the row, 5 from RealClearPolitics. Ballot readings: 10 from Silver Bulletin, 8 with no publisher named in the row, 4 from RealClearPolitics.
Show the 53 readings in both plots
| Date | Measure | Reading | Publisher |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -9.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jun 1, 2025 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jul 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -10 | Silver Bulletin |
| Aug 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -10.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Aug 1, 2025 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +3.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Sep 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -11 | Silver Bulletin |
| Oct 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -11.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Oct 1, 2025 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +4 | Silver Bulletin |
| Nov 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -12 | Silver Bulletin |
| Nov 15, 2025 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +4.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Dec 1, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -12.5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Dec 1, 2025 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5 | Silver Bulletin |
| Dec 15, 2025 | Presidential net approval | -13 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jan 1, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jan 8, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jan 22, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Jan 31, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13 | Not named in the row |
| Feb 1, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Feb 9, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13.7 | Not named in the row |
| Feb 9, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | Not named in the row |
| Feb 15, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15 | Not named in the row |
| Feb 25, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -14.9 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 1, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 4, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 4, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 9, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 10, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 12, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 14, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13.9 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 14, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 16, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -13.9 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 16, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 19, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.3 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 25, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.1 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 26, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -16.7 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 29, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.5 | Not named in the row |
| Mar 30, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -17.4 | Silver Bulletin |
| Mar 31, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.9 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 4, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -17.6 | Silver Bulletin |
| Apr 7, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -16.3 | Silver Bulletin |
| Apr 7, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.7 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 8, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -14.9 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 8, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.8 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 9, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | Silver Bulletin |
| Apr 10, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.1 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 10, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 12, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.4 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 13, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.1 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 14, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -15.2 | RealClearPolitics |
| Apr 17, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -16.6 | Silver Bulletin |
| Apr 19, 2026 | Presidential net approval | -16.6 | Silver Bulletin |
| Apr 19, 2026 | Generic ballot, Democratic margin | +5.6 | Silver Bulletin |
Outcome ranges
Five scenarios for November, with the range each was given at each update.
The outcome ranges are withheld. They are model output, and the House range has no published record: the calibration notice stands until the model has been checked against held-out cycles. The frame is shown; no seat value, range or probability is.
The scenarios were recorded at 6 updates: Mar 4, 2026; Mar 5, 2026; Mar 9, 2026; Mar 12, 2026; Mar 14, 2026; Mar 31, 2026.
Also tracked in this chapter
Show the 58 readings behind the ledger
| Series | Date | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Presidential net approval | Jan 20, 2017 | 0 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Jun 1, 2017 | -10 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 1, 2018 | -13 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Nov 6, 2018 | -10 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 1, 2019 | -12 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 1, 2020 | -9 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jun 1, 2020 | -12 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Nov 3, 2020 | -9 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 6, 2021 | -15 (FiveThirtyEight) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 20, 2025 | -2 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Feb 1, 2025 | -2.5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 1, 2025 | -5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 1, 2025 | -8 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | May 1, 2025 | -9 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Jun 1, 2025 | -9.5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Jul 1, 2025 | -10 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Aug 1, 2025 | -10.5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Sep 1, 2025 | -11 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Oct 1, 2025 | -11.5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Nov 1, 2025 | -12 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Dec 1, 2025 | -12.5 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Dec 15, 2025 | -13 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 1, 2026 | -13 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Jan 31, 2026 | -13 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Feb 9, 2026 | -13.7 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Feb 15, 2026 | -15 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Feb 25, 2026 | -14.9 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 1, 2026 | -13.5 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 4, 2026 | -13.5 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 10, 2026 | -13 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 14, 2026 | -13.9 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 16, 2026 | -13.9 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 19, 2026 | -15.3 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 25, 2026 | -15.3 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 26, 2026 | -16.7 (Not named in the row) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 30, 2026 | -17.4 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Mar 31, 2026 | -15.9 (RealClearPolitics) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 4, 2026 | -17.6 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 7, 2026 | -16.3 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 8, 2026 | -14.9 (RealClearPolitics) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 10, 2026 | -15.1 (RealClearPolitics) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 13, 2026 | -15.1 (RealClearPolitics) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 14, 2026 | -15.2 (RealClearPolitics) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 17, 2026 | -16.6 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Presidential net approval | Apr 19, 2026 | -16.6 (Silver Bulletin) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jun 1, 2022 | 79% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jan 1, 2023 | 71% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jun 1, 2023 | 62% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jan 1, 2024 | 63% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jun 1, 2024 | 62% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Nov 1, 2024 | 58% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jan 1, 2025 | 55% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Apr 1, 2025 | 58% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jul 1, 2025 | 57% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Oct 1, 2025 | 59% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Jan 1, 2026 | 60% (RCP avg) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Mar 3, 2026 | 61% (NPR/Marist) |
| Share saying the country is on the wrong track | Mar 24, 2026 | 61% (NPR/PBS/Marist) |
The race-by-race ratings, the House ratings, the race polling grid and the primary timeline that used to sit on this page now live on the races page and the states page , which carry them with their own sources and dates.
Read: Why a Landslide Is on the Table →Reference
How to read this page
Every figure is drawn on the server as SVG. There is no chart script, no canvas and no third party code on this route, so a reader with JavaScript disabled, a slow connection or a screen reader gets the same numbers as everyone else. Each figure carries a printed table of its own series, which is the reading path of record.
- Blue and red encode party data and nothing else. Every other series is drawn on the neutral chart scale in gold, slate, brown or muted ink.
- Series identity is carried by line weight and dash pattern as well as by colour, so the figures survive a monochrome print and a colour vision deficiency.
- A figure that draws two datasets stamps two dates. We do not average as-of dates into one.
- An incomplete cycle, a reconstructed estimate and a reported figure are drawn differently and labelled in the legend. An absence is stated, never left blank.
- No seat count, seat range or forecast number appears on this page except where the publication record says it may, and it is dated and labelled as our own model when it does.